In the interest of
offering content both didactic and accessible, the following Serious Topic will
not include proper source support. This means you shouldn’t believe any of it.
If you find the discussion compelling, however, I encourage you to pursue a
more demonstrable truth.
Recently, a speaker
visited my school to discuss foster care and the way the state and private
organizations interact in the allocation of foster children to loving families.
The issue I’d like to discuss today is the Establishment Clause conflict that arises
between the two.
For simplicity’s sake,
we can equate Establishment Clause issues to the conflict between church and
state. In fact, the original importance of that idea comes from Thomas
Jefferson’s personal correspondence, but the Establishment Clause has been
interpreted to form the legal basis for much of the curtailment of state
involvement in the religious sphere (and vice versa).
In the specific context
of foster children, the problem arises when the state contracts with
religiously-affiliated groups in the aid of foster children. I’ll offer a
paradigmatic (if simplified) example:
A Catholic charity group (we’ll call it CCG) signs a contract with the federal government. The contract stipulates that the federal government will fund the charity’s efforts to find good homes for foster children. It also stipulates that CCG will have the leeway to allocate children based on their own criteria, meaning that (1) Only Catholic families will get children, and (2) no homosexual couples will get children.
Note: Similar scenarios
occur in, for example, the context of rehabilitative centers. A Catholic
charity might contract with the state for funding, but stipulate that it will
include spiritual training as part of the rehabilitation process, and that it
won’t offer contraceptive or family planning assistance.
Another note: I’m just
picking on Catholics because the case law happens to; you could insert any
other religious persuasion and the legal implications wouldn’t change.
This scenario has been
ruled unconstitutional. I think that’s the right judgment. This is a case of
the federal government funding private religious practice. The state has a
monopoly on foster children; each foster child is a ward of the government. If
this were a private adoption scenario (e.g., a pregnant woman decides she wants
to offer up her baby for adoption and solicits only Muslims as potential
adoptive parents), there would be no problem.
That said, only the very
unimaginative would view such a ruling as anything other than a challenge! I
wonder what changes CCG could make to fit within constitutional bounds?
Certainly if the CCG
swore off any biases it would be OK. That is, contracting with a group that is
nominally religiously affiliated isn’t problematic, provided the government
isn’t funding religious practice. So if the CCG stipulates that it will use
only the foster program’s own guidelines for selecting homes for foster
children, the government would probably, I think, be allowed to contract. There
are some practical limitations (e.g., is the CCG really escaping
all of its biases?), of course.
What about a closer
question? There might be good reason to nitpick, as I speculate (based on no evidence
whatsoever) that there are some couples who both (1) would make great foster
parents, and (2) are only willing to adopt through religious entities. We don't
want to exclude these people from the running. As a solution, I propose that
the government be permitted to contract with religious organizations—even when
doing so means embracing their religious biases—when the following conditions
can be met:
-The religious organization is not given any
executive power in allocating children; the child remains a ward of the state.
Instead, the group provides the state only with information—e.g., a list of
potential foster parents. A list, yes, subject to religious biases.
-There is sufficient evidence that contracting
with that organization substantially supplements the state’s own list of
potential foster parents. In other words, the contract must actually increase
foster children’s access to homes.
-The state makes an effort to elicit similar
contracts from other biased groups, as well as its own efforts to seek
potential foster parents based on neutral criteria.
When I proposed a very
simplified version of this plan to the speaker, she shot me down. She might
have been right to do so. Even under this system, the state is funding
religious bias, which is kind of a per se no-no. However,
there’s a creative argument here, I think. The state has also neutered the
religious organization of all actual executive power, so it’s really just
buying information. That information is subject to certain filters, which
happen to be religious, but I’m not sure that’s a deal-breaker. It certainly
wouldn’t be unconstitutional for the government to contract with a neutral
non-profit specializing in finding foster parents. That group would naturally
use certain criteria for determining what qualifies candidates, and the
information would be more or less valuable to the government depending on how
accurate and exhaustive it was. Limiting the search to include only Catholics
just makes that information less exhaustive, and thus less valuable. In other
words, the state isn’t paying for the religious bias; it’s paying for neutral
information, discounted the influence of a religious bias.
Of course, that’s not
necessarily true. If the state doesn’t diversify its sources, it could mean
that all the foster children would just go to Catholics, essentially
establishing a Catholic cartel for foster kids (I can’t believe I just wrote
that). But that can be avoided if we enforce other sources of information who
aren’t subject to such limitations. Looking to different religious groups—all
of them likely very specialized in their communities, and thus good sources of
information—might give the state a cheaper and more exhaustive picture of the
potential foster parent scene on the whole.
I have to imagine that
there are large swathes of the USA where religious charities are
better-positioned than the government to find foster parents. Then again, these
are probably the exact communities where balancing the problematic contract
with countervailing factors would be the toughest to do.
It’s a tough point to
argue. I think I would lose, ultimately, but perhaps not 9-0. At least I’d have
the sympathetic client; you can be sure that the more liberally we allowed
these contracts, the more kids would end up in good homes. The ends never
justify the means, legally, but sometimes they do morally.
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